The Sword and the Shield Read online

  A Times reporter was with Mrs. Norwood early on the morning of September 11 as she listened to John Humphrys on the Today program first recount some of the contents of her KGB file noted by Mitrokhin, then interview myself and Ann Widdecombe. “Oh dear!” she told the Times reporter. “This is all so different from my quiet little life. I thought I’d got away with it. But I’m not that surprised it’s finally come out.” Within a few hours, a media scrum had gathered expectantly outside Mrs. Norwood’s end-of-terrace house, interviewing friends and neighbours about how she drank tea from a Che Guevara mug, put “Stop Trident” posters in her window, sold home-made chutney in aid of Cuban support groups, and delivered more than thirty copies of the Morning Star every Saturday morning to veterans of the Bexleyheath Old Left. Mrs. Norwood behaved with extraordinary composure when she emerged later in the day to face the media for the first time in her life. The image of the greatgranny spy walking down her garden path between well-tended rose bushes to make a confession of sorts to a large crowd of reporters caught the imagination of millions of television viewers and newspaper-readers. “I’m 87 and unfortunately my memory is not what it was,” Mrs. Norwood began. “I did what I did not to make money but to help prevent the defeat of a new system which had, at great cost, given ordinary people food and fares which they could afford, given them education and a health service.”

  As well as being a media sensation, Mrs. Norwood’s guarded public confession was a remarkable historical document. What had captured her imagination before the Second World War, like that of most other Soviet agents of the time, was not the brutal reality of Stalin’s Russia but the idealistic myth-image of the world’s first worker-peasant state which had abolished unemployment and for the first time enabled working people to realize their full potential — the “new system” nostalgically recalled by Mrs. Norwood when she spoke to reporters. In the mid 1930s that myth-image was so powerful that, for true believers who, unlike Melita Sirnis (as she then was), were able to go on pilgrimage to the Soviet Union, it survived even the contrary evidence of their own eyes. Malcolm Muggeridge, probably the best of the British journalists then in Moscow, later wrote of the British pilgrims he encountered:

  Their delight in all they saw and were told, and the expression they gave to that delight, constitute unquestionably one of the wonders of our age. There were earnest advocates of the humane killing of cattle who looked up at the massive headquarters of the OGPU [later the KGB] with tears of gratitude in their eyes, earnest advocates of proportional representation who eagerly assented when the necessity for a Dictatorship of the Proletariat was explained to them, earnest clergymen who reverently turned the pages of atheistic literature, earnest pacifists who watched delightedly tanks rattle across Red Square and bombing planes darken the sky, earnest town-planning specialists who stood outside overcrowded ramshackle tenements and muttered: “If only we had something like this in England!” The almost unbelievable credulity of these mostly university educated tourists astounded even Soviet officials used to handling foreign visitors…[5]

  When Melita Sirnis became a Soviet agent in 1937, the Soviet Union was in the midst of the Great Terror — the greatest peacetime persecution in modern European history.[6] Mrs. Norwood, however, still does not seem to grasp the depravity of the Stalinist regime into whose service she entered. “Old Joe [Stalin],” she acknowledges, “wasn’t a hundred percent, but then the people around him might have been making things awkward, as folks do.” At the end of her press statement, she was asked if she had any regrets about her career as a Soviet agent. “No,” she replied, then went back inside her house. In another interview she declared, “I would do everything again.”[7]

  Another former Soviet spy identified in The Mitrokhin Archive who made front-page news in Britain was ex-Detective Sergeant John Symonds. Like Norwood, Symonds gave a number of interviews. Symonds confessed to being, as Mitrokhin’s notes reveal, probably the first British “Romeo spy” recruited by the KGB. He said that he had admitted as much almost twenty years earlier to MI5 and Scotland Yard but had been disbelieved. Though Mitrokhin’s notes give no statistics of the number of women seduced by Symonds during his career as a KGB illegal, Symonds claims that there were “hundreds” of them. Initially the KGB decided that his sexual technique was deficient and, to his delight, sent “two extremely beautiful girls” to act as his instructors. Symonds’s recollection of his subsequent career as a Romeo spy is rather rosier than suggested by his KGB file:

  I just had a nice life. I’d say join the KGB, see the world — first class. I went all over the world on these jobs and I had a marvellous time. I stayed in the best hotels, I visited all the best beaches. I’ve had access to beautiful women, unlimited food, champagne, caviar, whatever you like, and I had a wonderful time. That was my KGB experience.

  “The only people I hurt,” Symonds now claims, “was the Metropolitan Police.”[8] Many of the women he seduced on KGB instructions would doubtless disagree.

  Media reaction to Mitrokhin’s revelations was as parochial in most other countries as it was in Britain. The public appeal of the Russian agents identified by Mitrokhin is curiously similar to that of Olympic medal-winners. In espionage as in athletics, most of the world’s media are interested first and foremost in the exploits of their own nationals. The human-interest stories which aroused most interest in the United States were probably the KGB “active measures” designed to discredit the long-serving Director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover, and the great civil rights leader Martin Luther King. The KGB was among the first to spread stories that Hoover was a predatory homosexual. King, whom the KGB feared might avert the race war it hoped would be ignited by the long hot summers which began in 1965, was probably the only American to be the target of both KGB and FBI active measures.

  The topic in The Mitrokhin Archive (published in the USA as The Sword and the Shield) which attracted most attention in Congress concerned KGB preparations for sabotage operations against American targets during the Cold War. On October 26, 1999, I gave televised testimony on these preparations to a packed hearing of the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee. Mitrokhin’s material identifies the approximate locations of a number of the secret sites in the United States selected for KGB arms and radio caches for use in sabotage operations. On present evidence, it is impossible to estimate the number of these caches which were put in place. However, the former KGB general Oleg Kalugin, who was stationed in New York and Washington during the 1960s and early 1970s, has confirmed the existence of some KGB arms caches in the United States.[9] As in Europe, some caches were probably booby-trapped and may now be in a dangerous condition. For reasons of public safety, The Mitrokhin Archive gave no clues to the location of any of the American sites selected for KGB arms caches. ABC TV News, however, revealed that one of the sites is located in the region of Brainerd, Minnesota.[10] Later press reports, citing “congressional sources,” claimed that the FBI had carried out a search of the Brainerd area.[11]

  In western Europe, The Mitrokhin Archive generated more front-page stories in Italy than it did even in Britain — though almost all the stories, unsurprisingly, were on Italian topics. In October 1999 an Italian parliamentary committee released 645 pages of reports (codenamed IMPEDIAN) on the Italians mentioned in the Mitrokhin archive which had been supplied several years earlier by SIS to Italian intelligence. Most KGB contacts were identified in the reports by name as well as codename. The Italian Foreign Ministry was said to be investigating the cases of thirty employees referred to in Mitrokhin’s notes. Much of the furore aroused by The Mitrokhin Archive in Italy, however, consisted of a revival of Cold War points-scoring which produced more political heat than historical light. Opponents of the government headed by the former Communist Massimo D’Alema seized on the references to Armando Cossutta, leader of the Communist PDCI which was represented in D’Alema’s coalition government. The Left retaliated by pointing to the identification in an IMPEDIAN report of a sena
tor of the right-wing Forza Italia. The debate became further confused by conspiracy theorists on both right and left. A cartoon in La Repubblica, which D’Alema denounced as libellous, showed him blanking out a series of (presumably left-wing) names from the IMPEDIAN reports before their release. L’Unità, by contrast, claimed that left-wing ministers were increasingly convinced that the reports were the result of a plot by MI5 (which it apparently confused with SIS): “What has arrived is not a dossier from the KGB but one about the KGB constructed by British counter-espionage agents based on the confession of an ex-agent, if there is one, and ‘Mitrokhin’ is just a codename for an MI5 operation.”[12]

  The political controversy provoked in Britain by the publication of The Mitrokhin Archive centred chiefly on the behaviour of ministers and the intelligence community. Why, it was asked, had Melita Norwood not been prosecuted when her treachery had been known at least since Mitrokhin’s defection in 1992? And why had ministers not been better briefed about her and other traitors identified in the Mitrokhin archive by the intelligence and security agencies? It emerged, to my surprise, that I had known about the Norwood case for considerably longer than either the Home Secretary or the Prime Minister. Jack Straw was informed in December 1998 that Mitrokhin’s information might lead to the prosecution of “an 86-year-old woman who spied for the KGB forty years ago,” but was not told her identity until some months later. Tony Blair was not briefed about Mrs. Norwood until shortly before her name appeared on the front page of The Times.[13]

  The failure to prosecute Mrs. Norwood combined with the delays in briefing ministers aroused deep suspicion in some of the media. The Express denounced “an appalling culture of cover-ups and incompetence in Britain’s secret services.” The Guardian suspected an MI5 plot:

  We need to know whether Melita Norwood made a deal with the security services. Remember Blunt.[14] Was the decision not to prosecute her based on compassion, or a desire to cover up security service incompetence?

  Less than a decade earlier there would have been no mechanism for investigating these charges capable of inspiring public and parliamentary confidence. Until 1992 successive British governments refused even to admit SIS’s existence on the extraordinary, though traditional, grounds that such an admission would put national security at risk. Had SIS still been officially taboo seven years later, no official inquiry could possibly have produced a credible public report on the handling of the Mitrokhin archive. In 1999, however, there was an obvious body to conduct an inquiry: the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), established under the Intelligence Services Act of 1994 to examine “the expenditure, administration and policy” of the intelligence and security agencies.

  Since it began work in 1994, the ISC has been a largely unsung success story.[15] Though not technically a parliamentary committee, since it reports to Parliament only through the Prime Minister, eight of its nine members are MPs. (The ninth is a member of the House of Lords.) Under the chairmanship of the former Conservative Defense Secretary, Tom King, its membership spans the political spectrum. Its founder members included Dale Campbell-Savours, previously a leading Labour critic of the intelligence community, who still serves on it. Largely because its members have failed either to divide on party lines and fall out among themselves or to find evidence of major intelligence abuses, the ISC has attracted relatively little media attention. Its generally positive reports on the performance of the intelligence community, however, have inevitably been dismissed by some conspiracy theorists as evidence of a cover-up.

  On Monday, September 13, 1999, only two days after The Times had begun serialization of The Mitrokhin Archive, Jack Straw announced in a statement to the Commons that the ISC had been asked to conduct an inquiry into “the policies and procedures adopted within the Security and Intelligence Agencies for the handling of the information supplied by Mr Mitrokhin.” Over the next nine months the ISC heard evidence from Jack Straw, Robin Cook and four former Conservative ministers, from the heads and other senior officers of MI5 and SIS, from the previous head of MI5, and from the Cabinet Secretary, Permanent Under Secretaries at the Home and Foreign Offices and other officials. Among the final witnesses were Mitrokhin and myself, who gave evidence to the ISC in the Cabinet Office at 70 Whitehall one after the other on the morning of March 8, 2000. While writing The Mitrokhin Archive, I had wrongly assumed that the Committee had been informed about the project. Some of the confusion which followed publication might well have been avoided if the ISC had been properly briefed well beforehand.

  The ISC report in June 2000 identified a series of administrative errors which, as usual in Whitehall, had more to do with cock-up than with conspiracy. The first “serious failure” identified by the ISC was the failure of the Security Service to refer the case of Mrs. Norwood to the Law Officers in 1993:

  This failure… resulted in the decision whether or not to prosecute Mrs. Norwood effectively being taken by the Security Service. The Committee is concerned that the Service used public interest reasons to justify taking no further action against Mrs. Norwood, when this was for the Law Officers to decide. We also believe that the failure of the Security Service to interview Mrs. Norwood at this time prevented her possible prosecution.

  For the next five years, owing to “a further serious failure by the Security Service,” the Norwood case “slipped out of sight.”[16] MI5 may not deserve a great deal of sympathy for its oversight, but it does deserve some. The first priority of any security service are actual, followed by potential, threats. Among the mass of material provided by Mitrokhin in 1992, the case of the eighty-year-old Mrs. Norwood, who had last been in contact with the KGB over a decade earlier and no longer posed any conceivable danger to national security, must have seemed a very low priority — particularly given the strain on MI5’s resources caused by cutbacks at the end of the Cold War and the threat from Irish terrorist groups.

  Arguably, however, MI5 underestimated Mrs. Norwood’s past importance. In evidence to the ISC, the Security Service concluded that her “value as an atom spy to the scientists who constructed the Soviet bomb must have been, at most, marginal.”[17] That was not the view of the NKGB (as the KGB was then known) in the final months of the Second World War. In March 1945 it described the atomic intelligence she had provided as “of great interest and a valuable contribution to the development of work in this field.”[18] Though Mrs. Norwood was not, of course, an atom spy in the same class as Ted Hall and Klaus Fuchs, both of whom provided intelligence from inside the main nuclear laboratory at Los Alamos, the NKGB and the Soviet scientists with whom it was in close touch plainly regarded her intelligence as somewhat better than “marginal.” The intelligence she was able to provide on uranium fuel cladding and post-irradiation corrosion resistance was probably applicable to weapons development as well as to the construction of nuclear reactors.[19] Until the final months of the War, the NKGB rated the atomic intelligence obtained in Britain almost as highly as that from the United States.[20]

  As Jack Straw told the Commons when announcing the ISC inquiry, “There is no reason to doubt… that the KGB regarded Mrs. Norwood as an important spy.” Nor is there reason to doubt that she was both the KGB’s longest-serving British agent and its most important female British spy. From early in her career, the KGB had high expectations of her. It maintained contact with her in 1938-39 at a time when the shortage of foreign intelligence officers, many of whom were executed during the Terror, led it to lose touch with many other agents — including some of the Magnificent Five. Since the publication of The Mitrokhin Archive, Viktor Oshchenko, a former senior officer in the KGB scientific and technological intelligence (S) directorate, has kindly given me his recollections of the Norwood case. While stationed at the London residency in 1975, Oshchenko recruited Michael Smith, the KGB’s most important British S agent during the later Cold War.[21] He remembers Mrs. Norwood’s career as a Soviet agent as “a legendary case in the annals of the KGB — an important, determined and
very valuable agent,” and was deeply impressed both by her ideological commitment and by her remarkable access to her boss’s papers. Among the intelligence which Oshchenko believes Mrs. Norwood supplied were “valuable papers relating to the materials involved in missile production.”[22] Details of the use made of Mrs. Norwood’s intelligence within the Soviet Union, however, remain scarce. Mitrokhin’s notes from her file, though giving precise information on Mrs. Norwood’s controllers and other operational matters, give little indication of the doubtless complex intelligence she supplied in the course of her long career as a Soviet agent. It is highly unlikely that the SVR will reveal any details of this intelligence until after Mrs. Norwood’s death.

  As well as criticizing MI5 for allowing the Norwood case to “slip out of sight,” the ISC also considered it “a serious failure of the Security Service not to refer Mr. Symonds’ case to the Law Officers in mid-1993.” This too was plainly the result of cock-up rather than conspiracy — probably somewhere in MI5’s middle management. Even the Director-General of the Security Service from 1992 to 1996, Stella Rimington, was not informed by her staff of either the Norwood or the Symonds case, and was thus unable to brief Michael Howard, Home Secretary in the Major government, and his Permanent Under Secretary. Further confusion arose as a result of the fact that the “interdepartmental working group” in Whitehall responsible for monitoring the progress of the publication project was itself “unaware of the significance of [Mitrokhin’s] UK material until late 1998.”[23] My own direct contact with the working group was limited to an enjoyable lunch with its Chairman shortly before Christmas 1998. I was asked, when giving evidence to the ISC, whether, while writing The Mitrokhin Archive, I would have liked greater contact with the group. I would indeed.